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Case No.
10414

STATEJ\1ENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This was a civil action brought under the provisions of Sectons 14-2-1 and 14-2-2 of Utah Code Annotated, 19 53 , as
amended, whereby the Plaintiff-Appellant, Apex Lumber Company, seeks payment for the unpaid value of materials supplied
by plaintiff to the Comanche Construction Company, and used
in the construction of four pole-type turkey brooding barns
on land owned by the defendants-respondents, Moroni Feed
Company. D. A. Shand, Howard Willardsen and Richard Jen.
sen.
DISPOSITION IN LO\VFR COURT
Plaintiff, Apex Lumber Company, commenced four individual actions in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake
County, against Comanche Construction Company, Raymond
Clark and the four defendants, Moroni Feed Company, D. A.
Shand, Howard \Villardsen and Richard Jensen. Comanche Construction Company and Raymond Clark were non-residents of
Utah. On the defendants' motion for a change of venue, the
matters were set down to the Seventh Judicial District Court,
Sanpete County.
On stipulation of counsel, the four cases \\'ere joined for
purposes of trial and tried before a jury. The court propounded
a special verdict to the jury, containing six \\'ntten interrogatories; an<l based upon the jury's ans\\'ers to said interrogatories, the court rendered judgment against the plaintiff for no
cause of action against the defendants.
Plaintiff mond for a directed verdict in fa,·or of the plaintiff against the defendants. Motion for directed ,-erdict was deriled and overruled. Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial.
which was heard June 8, 1965. The court took the same under
advisement at that time. On June 22, 1965, the court ruled on
plaintiff's motion for new trial b:· denying same. Plaintiff appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the lower court's judgment and
that this court adjudicate:
1. That plaintiff never received foll pa:·ment for the m~-

terials use<l in the construction of pole-type turkey brooder
barns on land belonging to the defendants.
2. That under the provisions of 14-2-1 and 14-2-2 of Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, plaintiff is entitled to hold
the defendants personally liable for the unpaid value of materials used in constructing the buildings on their lands.
3. That acceptance of contractor's unsecured promissory
notes did not constitute payment of the amount owing on the
materials.
4. That the mere statement of plaintiff's employee that
contractor was not in default with the plaintiff would not create z.n estoppel barring plaintiff's recovery from defendants .
.~. That, as a matter of law, plaintiff is entitled to recover
the amounts prayed for in its complaints, or, that failing, the
c:ascs remanded for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
During the summer of 1960, a contractor from MinnesGta b:· the name of Raymond Clark, and holding himself out as
President of Comanche Construction Company, Inc., (T-10)
contracted with se\·eral turkey farmers living in Sanpete County, Utah, to build pole-type turkey brooding barns for them.
The fact that Mr. Clark at this time had not incorporated his
company and did not incorporate it until after the defendants'
buildings were completed was not known by either plaintiff or
defendants until later. (T-56) Comanche Construction Company
transferred men and equipment from Minnesota to Utah and
commenced work in October of 1960. (T-9)
Plaintiff's first witness was Guy L. Pittman, an employee
of Comanche Constrnction Company, who came to Utah as
the Supervisor of Sales and Construction. (T-9) Mr. Pittman,
with authority to hire and fire the men, had the responsibility
to see that the buildings under contract were built and to sell
other buildings. (T- io)
With the help of Exhibit 15, Mr. Pittman's undisputed
testimony (T-38, T-45 through T-51) showed that Comanche
Construction Company constructed pole-type hams for the fol-

lowing people, starting and finishing the jobs on the dates set
opposite their names:
Jobs
I. Rulon Sowby
Ray Olsen
3. La Mont Blackham
4. Cliff Blackham
5· Movle Blackham
6. Mark Christensen
7. Howard \Villardsen
8. D. A. Shand
9. Richard Jensen
1o. Moroni Feed Company
I I. Warren Goates
I 2. Bruce Barton
13· Dick Barker

Started
Oct. I 8, 1960
Oct. 2 3, 1960
Oct. 24, 1960
Oct. 29, 1960
Nov. 5, 1960
Oct. 26, 1960
Dec. I 2, 1960
Dec. 13, 1960
Dec. 14, 1960
Jan. I 2, 1961
Feb. 8, 1961
Feb. 8, 1961
.\I ar. I), I 96 I

Finished
Nov. 30, 1960
Dec. 2, 1960
Dec. 2 I, 1960
Dec. 14, 1960
Dec. 2 I, 1960
Jan. 7, 1961
Jan. 24, 1961
Jan. 2 5, 1961
Feb. I 8, 1961
Mar. I, 1961
Mar. r, 1961
Mar. 14, 1961
Mav 3, 1961
\Vith Exhibits 1 through 6, Mr. Pittman testified that he supervised the construction of a building 76 feet wide and 200
feet long with a 30 foot addition for defendant, l\foroni Feed
Company. He explained in det;.iil \vhat the building looks like
and the type and quantity of materials used in it. (T- 1 1 through
T-26) Mr. Pittman's undisputed testimony was that the material used in the construction of the building was supplied by
plaintiff; that this material included poles, steel, lumber and
hardware. (T-26)
1\lr. Pittman further testified that the three buildings constructed for defendants, D. A. Shand, Howard Willardsen and
Richard Jensen, were 76 feet by 150 feet. With the help of Exhibits 7 through 1 2, he detailed the type and quantity of materials which included the poles, steel, lumber and hardware; that
all of this material w1s supplied hy plaintiff. (T-27 through
T-38)
Mr. Pittman sometimes signed the farmers to a contract,
and regarding the procedure for ordering the materials testified:
"A: When I sold these buildings, I sent the copy of the
contract to Hopkins, Minnesota to Comanche Construction Company. I gave them the size and the spe~
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cifications on it, and they sent the purchase orders to
my knowledge to Apex Lumber Company and from
·
there we received the lumber.
"Q: Did you have a snpervisory capacity over the purchase
orders'
"A: No.
''A· It came directly fiom Hopkins, l\'linnesota, unless I
had a shortage on the job I would call Apex Lumber
in Salt Lake City, and they would deliver on the
shortage of materials." (T-39)
!\Ir. Pittman's further nnchallen'.!ed testimony was that they
had very little material left over on the jobs, cm-offs and this
rvpe of thing. (T-39)
At the completion of the jobs the defencbnts, in each instance, paid Mr. Pittman in full. The checks were sent back to
the head office qf Comanche Consf"ruction Company at Hopkins, Minnesota. Regarding the giving- of lien waivers, the procedure was not the same in all instances. On occasion he gave
lien \\ aivers to the property owners. Sometimes these lien waivers bore the signarnre of the suppliers and other times they
\\·e~e signed only hy him. It would depend on what he had
been supplied by Comanche Construction Comp<my. \Vhen he
gave lien waivers signed only by him. it was with the stipulation that materials were not paid for by Comanche Construcrion Company. (T-43)
YVhen questioned on whether or not he had received payment from the defendants, l\1r. Pittman answered:
"A: I did. The fact is we may have had a few hours work
left on some of the buildings when these people paid
for them. There was no anrument whatsoever with
anyone about paving for these buildings." (T-40)
Under cross-examination, Mr. Pittman testified that the
rost of the material in these buildinP"s
was roughly between sixtv
i.'.:I
.,
:md sixty-five cents a square foot. (T-76)
On redirect examination, Mr. Pittman testified all of the
steel shipped into Sanpete County from Illinois was three inch
corruaated steel and this steel was used in the construction of
the fi~t six buildings. The steel was used in the four buildings of
~

~

the defendants was t\vo and one-half inch steel. (T- 78)
Questioned concerning material belonging to Comanche
Com:truction Company that he might have sold, he was asked
"Q: You testified some of the materials left over from th
. b
c
JO s were sold. Any material left over from a job in
Sanpete County sold to anyone in your knowledge?
"A: Not to my knO\vledge. Usually we was always short
~ mrteri~.
·
"Q: And what would you do in case you were short?
"A: Call Apex Lumber Company and have it delivered
out." (T-78)
When asked nhout fie crc\\'s moving the materials from job
site to job site, he responded as follows:
"Q: And wns all of the material at this time being purchased from Apex Lumber?
"A: It was.
"Q: So whether it was taken from Jensen to someone else
and brought back it was, all of the material was orig
inally pu~chased from Apex?
'
"A: It all came from Apex Lumber." (T-80)
The next two witnesses were Dnrrell Ben Tucker and Pite;
Vander V ::iart, both ernp!oy·cd at plaintiff's lumber yard. They
testified that during January, 1961 they personall_v, with one
other driver, delivered the lumber and steel to the sites of the
Willardsen building, the Shand building, the Jensen buildin'.!·
and Moroni Feed Company building. (T-87 through T-95)
Plaintiff's next witness was J. \V. Child, General Mana?,"er
of the plaintiff. He testified that in September or October of
1960 plaintiff was requested by Raymond Clark to furnish quotations on materials. Plaintiff responded znd in October, 1960
received purchase orders (Exhit;it 24) from Comanche Construction Company for materials t:i (;e used in the construction
of six pole-type buildings in the Sanpete County area.
.
Upon completion of the first six jobs, plaintiff received
purchase orders from Comanche Construction Company for
four additional buildings. (Exhibits 2 5 through 2 8 are these purchase orders.) It was the material supplied by plaintiff on these
four purchase orders that went into the buildings owned by de6

fendants. (T-100 through T-rn4)
Mr. Child further testified that because material was ordered by the construction crews to make up shortages, the jobs
could not be billed to Comanche Construction Company until
they were completed. Prices on all materials were pre-arranged,
(T-104) and as agreed with Comanche Construction Company,
plaintiff was to be paid at the completion of the job. (T- rn5)
A summary of Comanche Construction Compan:/s account
was given by plaintiff in a letter dated January 30, 1961. (Exhibit 41) On February 14, 1951, plaintiff received a $10,000.00
payment from Comanche Construction Company, and on Februarv 2 1, 1961 plaintiff again wrote Comanche Construction
Company to show how the payment had been allocated and to
bring- the account current. (Exhibit 42) Plaintiff maintained a
ledger card on Comanche Construction Compan\· (Fxhihit i.9)
\I hich Mr. Child explained at T-rn7:
''A: This is a copy of the ledger card, commonly referred
to as an account receivable card. hctw<::cn Apex Lumber
and Hardware and Comanche Constructio:i Company.
The debit items show the items that were sold to Comanche Construction Compan:: and the credit items on
the ledger card show the items the Comanche Construction Company paid to Apex Lumber and Hard"·are Company. And be;.'ond this we show payments
received of $2,ooo on October 20, and this was the beginning date, as I mentioned, on the first six jobs, and
this $z,ooo represented a deposit that we required of
Comanche Construction Company before we began
shipping to them because of their unproven credit with
us and pending our credit inve~tigation of them. On
February or December 6 the\· paid $1,833.54, which
\vould ~orrespond with one of the purchase orders on
those original six jobs. On December 16, they paid
$3.667.08, which corresponds with two of the purchase
orders on the first six jobs. And January 10 they paid
$z,353.46, which again corresponds with one of the
large jobs and the lumber furnished. February 15 they
paid $6,628.75, which cleared these original six jobs."

The next payment was the last payment received by plaintiff from Comanche Construction Company. It was for $8 _
000.00, and ,\Ir. Child testified that at Raymond Clark's direction the Bruce Barton job was given full credit and the balance of the p:iyment 'vas applied to the defendants' jobs:
''THE \VITNESS: Thank you, sir. Mr. Clark came into
my office and to me personally handed a check for
$8,ooo, and this was the final payment I received from
Comanche Construction Company. This was on the
20th day of l\1arch, just six day-s after Mr. Barton·s
job was completed. And ,\fr. Clark informed me to
apply this eight thous:m<l dollars to .\1r. Barton's 1ob.
Therefore, the five thousand three hundred seventveight dollars 'vas credited here and the balance of tl~is
money, plus the four thousand one hundred eleven dollars collected prior were prorated to the jobs of the
Hatchery, Shand's, \Villardsen's and Jensen's as being
the only other four jobs outstanding with Apex Lumber. After receiving these payments, the amount still
due from Mr. Shand's iob was fortv-seven
hundred
.
forty-three; J\lr. \Villardsen's was forty-six ninety-seven; Mr. Jensen's forty-nine forty; the Hatchery fortysix seventv-se,-en, and :\Ir. Barton's job, per the instructions of Mr. Clark, was paid in full.'' (T-1 17)
Mr. Child was guestioned as to 'vhat procedure plaintiff
used in deciding to sue these particular defendants, and 8t
T-125, with the use of the blackboard, an.s,vered:
"THE WITNESS: Thank you for your diligence. According to Apex Lumber's record, and I will not start
with the first jobs because they do not apply, but the
later jobs were completed on the follmving dates. Let's
start with Christensen's on Tanuarv 7. Then Mr.
Shand's was completed on Ja nuary. 2 5. .\fr. \Villardsen's on January 24. Mr. Jensen's on February 18. Moroni Hatchery was completed on !\larch 1. Mr. Bar:on's job was completed on March 1+ J\lr. Goates, this
is a Lehi, Utah, job, was completed on March 1, and
Mr. Barker's, which is the Kearns job, was completed
)

0

on May 3. These are the completion dates and the
dates which establishes to us the precedent as to which
were materials to be billed out first and which were
last. After Comanche Construction Company took out
their bankruptcy, lawsuits were then instigated against
Barker for his job, Mr. Goates for his job, f\fr. Barton
was issued full credit, as I mentioned a minute ago, so
Mr. Barton's job was paid for. Now Mr. Barker and
Mr. Goates both settled their lawsuit. They, with Apex
Lumber got together and we settled the amount and
got the money from both of these brethren, both of
these gentlemen. Then we took the total amount due,
which is nineteen thousand dollars, and applied it to the
very next jobs, which was Moroni Hatchery, Jensen's,
Willardsen's and Shand's, which left this one out because these four would satisfy' the entire judgment that,
excuse me, the entire liability· that Apex had against Comanche. There was nothing hit or miss :>.!iout it. These
were settled."
(Exhibit 39 is copy of blackboard exhibit.)
Plaintiff's extended billings to Comanche Construction
Company (Exhibits 30 through 33) detail the unpaid value of
the materials in each of the defendants' buildings. (T-120 and
T-121.)

Commenting on the figure that Mr. Pittman used in his
testimony of sixty cents per square foot as the basis for figuring the cost of the material, Mr. Child diagrammed on the
blackboard another method of arriving at the unpaid value for
which plaintiff is suing defendants. (T- 110 through T-1 18) (Exhibit ) 7 is an exact duplicate of the computations put on the
blackboard.)
When Comanche Construction Company failed to send
more money Mr. Child testified of his efforts to collect it:
"A: Y~s'. There were several efforts made to collect this
money. We contacted Mr. Clark very frequently; made
telephone calls, trips, engaged a lawyer, and one trip
when ~fr. Clark ·was in Salt Lake and I got him in my
office and he committed that he had coming to him
9

within one week five thousand dollars :md within two
weeks he told me he had sixteen thousand dollars corning to. him. And so .I asked him if he would object
to gwmg me a promissory note promising to me that
he would pay this money when he collected it. And
so J\1r. Clark wrote out two promissory notes, one for
five thousand dollars :md one for sixteen thousand, and
the five thousand one was for seven days only because
he said he was going to collect his money in seven davs,
and the other one was for seventeen days because ·he
said he was going to coliect the sixteen .thousand dollars in tv,·o "·eeb from some other source. And I had
him give me these two promissory notes which would,
I felt, obligate him to gi\·e me this adclitio111l moncr
"·hen he ~ot it collected. And then finallv
we enaaaed
.
b ::i
a lawyer in connection with the defendants to this trial
and brought suit ag:i'.nst i\fr. Clark and Comanche Construction Compan:· and he took out hankruptc:' and
went insolvent." (T-1z1)
When asked if he had taken the r.otes as satisfaction for the
money owing, Mr. Child answered:
"A: Never. In no case were the notes ever credited on to
Comanche Construction's account. They were taken
only to secure the payment of the funds he had promised him, but I certainly did not take them in payment
of the account." (T-124)
Mr. Child further testified that neither Ravmond Clark nor
Comanche Construction Company ever denied owing this money. That on March 31, 1961, an audit of Comanche Construction Company records conducted by an independent firm in
,\ 1innesota revealed only a small difference of approximately
$160.00 out of a total amount owing of $q.,o.p.oo. (Exhibit 3-1)
The Barker job \vhich finished May 3, 196 1 brought the amount
owing to over $Jo,ooo.oo. (T-12 3)
.
On cross-examination, Mr. Child testified that though plaintiff employed a man by the name of H. ]. Rasmussen dur'.ng
1961 as a bookkeeper, he did not have authority to issue hen
waivers on behalf of the plaintiff. (T-149)
~·

JO

Defendants' first witness was Charles Devon Beck, an employee of Comanche Construction Company from November,
19 60 until the spring of 1 961. Mr. Beck testified that material
was moved by Comanche Construction Company from job to
job, On cross-examination, he testified that Comanche Construction used two small trucks, one a ton and a half and the
other one a pickup, to move the material. (T-184)
Defendants' next witness \Vas Mark Christensen. He testified
that he was Assistant to the Manager of Moroni Feed Company
and also a turkey raiser. That Comanche Construction Company
had built a barn for him. During January and part of February,
1961 he had loaned his truck to Comanche Construction Company. Periodically he saw his truck with materials on it but
did not know where the material was being taken. (T-185 and
T-186)

Mr. Bruce Bartrm testified next for the defendants to the
effcct that he had Comanche Constr•.1ctinn Company build a
pole-tvpe barn for protection for his s 11c~~p. He did not request
a bond from Comanche Construction Company, did not ask for
no;· receive lien waivers. (T-189)
Next witness for the defendants 'Was Clifford Blackham, a
turkev grower and Manager of the ;\Ioroni Feed Company's
Hatchery and Brooder Farms. Mr. Blackham negotiated with
.\1r. Raymond Clark for the construction of two buildings, one
for himself and one for Moroni Feed Company. (T-190) On
January 23, 1961, Mr. Shand and Mr. Willardsen came to his
office concerned with whether or not they should pay Comanche Construction Company the final payment for their
buildings. (T-192) They decided to call suppliers to find out
if things "·ere in order to make the fin'.11 payment. l\fr. Blackham testified:
"A: \Vell, I placed a call to Scherer Brothers Lumber Company in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and Apex Lumber
Company in Salt Lake Cit~,- to :\fr. Rasmussen, because
Mr. Rasmussen had signed m~· lien waiver from Apex
on my own personal building. At the time I gave my
deposition I didn't remember who I spoke to, but when
I checked it out with the telephone companv and got
11

their information I had talke<l to ;\Ir. Rasmussen. And
;\Ir. R;1srnussen told us, told me that the accounts were
clear ,rnd it was clear to go ahca<l and make the fmal
payrr:cnt to Apex Lumber Comp:my. And on this basis
of this information these men went out and paid for
the buildings and \\ e p:1id for our Feed Com pan\·
building, the firnl p,1_n 1ents." (T-195)
·
He testified that on r:1:::: basis of this information, he advised l\lr. Shand and l\Ir. \\'ilbrdscn to make the final pa:-:ments
to Comanche Construction Cumpan:-;. He further testified that
it was on the basis of this connrsatioi1 \\·ith .\Ir. Rasmussen that
Moroni Feed Compan:· paid Corna'lchc Comtruction in full
On cross-cxaminati<m, he ~rill mJintJined th;1t, cnn thonrrh the
date of tl~e com-cr~;ation \\ ith .\Ir. Ras111msen took place J~nuan
2 3fd and 1\loroni Feed Compan<s job \1·as not completeJ um.ii
March 1st, (T-:o-1-) his fears Jud been alleviated and he made
the final pa~·ments on relia•1cc of ,\Ir. Rasmmscn's statement
He couldn't remember whecher .\Ir. lbsmus~cn had informer!
him that all the materials that \\"Cnt into the jobs had been ?aid
for. He stated that the reason the:-· had made the phone call
was for some protection; and \\ he!1 he ''as asked \\·hether he
had requested a lien \\"ai\·er from Coi11:111che Construction Company, he answered:
"A: It has been too long. I can't remember \\·hether I mace
a request or not. I would assume that I may have done.
but I don't know. I just don't remember that.
"Q: \Vould this be because you rcali1e the importance of
this lien waver?
"A: I do, yes.
"Q: But you didn't thi:ik it was important enough to get
it in writing. Is that right?
"A: Yes. I think I would kno\\. to get it in \\"riting ..\ladle
I would assume the telephone call from the people
would be a~surance to me." (T-2 11)
Richard Jensen testified on direct examination that Co·
manche Construction C.:impany built a pole barn for him. "When
his building was finished, he had talked to Art Shand ahout
whether t; pay Comanche Construction. He was worried be1

I2

cause Comanche Construction Company was behind in their labor payments. (T-220) Shand had told him that they had made
an investigation and as far as he could see, it wa~ alright to
pay. (T-214) He also testified that he did not ask Mr. Pittman
for a lien waiver for the materials. (T-219) He remembers also
talking to 1\fr. Blackham. He remembered that he talked to Don
Tibbs, his attorney, but could not remember what ,l\fr. Tibbs
advised f-jm. On Shand's advice, he went ahead and made final
payment.
Direct examination of defendants' witness, Howard \Villardsen, re\·ealed that he contracted with Comanche Construction
Company for a pole-type turkey brooder barn; that the pole
barn was built in conformity with the contract. (T-223) That
he knew there was a question about some labor payments owed
by Comanche Construction Company. For this reason he worried about the solvency of Comanche Construction Company,
and before making final payment, he and D. A. Shand went
tn J\Ir. Blackham's office, and concernin§[ the telephone call he
said:
"A: Well, of course I don't kno\,., I didn't speak myself,
but \Ve received assurance from Cliff that it was all
right with Comanche Construction, \Vith Apex Lumber
Company if we paid Comanche because apparently
they were solvent and they had no concern about Comanche paying their bills. Certainly I wouldn't have
paid it if I hadn't of had this assurance." (T-2 2 5)
He made final pa_vment January 28, 1961.
On cross-examination, }\fr. Willardsen testified that he
knew Comanche Construction Company was having trouble
paying their bills at a lumber y-ard at Ephraim; that a co-op
senrice station held a bill for oil products against Comanche
Construction Company. (T-229) He also remembered being
told bv Mr. Pittman that Comanche Construction Company
would' have to have the money before he could get the lien
waiver; that he understood that the money was needed to pay
plaintiff before Pittman could give him the lien waivers.
(T-231)
On direct examination, D. A. Shand testified that Comanche

I~

Construction C?mpany constructed a building on his propeny;
that he made fo1::1l payment January 28, 1961, which included
the cost of some ventilation equipment. He testified that he
made several im1uiries into the position of Comanche Construction before making final pavment, e\'en g-oing- so far as takinatJ a
trip to Spring City to talk to 1\1r. Beck to find out whether or
not 1\lr. Beck had received his wages.
\\'hen asked by his attornc) :
"Q: 'Vhat else did you do?
"A: \Veil, the \\·ord was that there was several small bilb
owed in Ephraim; that they had had a bank account
in the Ephraim Bank and it was dclinciuent; their
checks weren't good and there was several people owed
that didn't have their money. I got in touch \vith Mr.
Willardsen, we talked about it several days, :!nd one
day when it \Vas right clmc to where we were obligated to pay these, we had signed a contract to pay
these, pay for this building as soon as it was completed,
because it was explained to us that they needed the
money to pay for the material. They told us that before we ever signed the contract. YVe went up and
talked it over with Cliff Blackham." (T-235 and T"

L

236)

..._

He further testified that he called his attornev, Don Tibbs,
and asked what he should do and was told not to pay it; however, he still felt obligated to pay the bills, and after the telephone conversation in Mr. Blackham's office paid the bill. He
talked to Jensen, and Jensen relied upon him to get the information because Jensen was out on the farm.
On cross-examination, when asked what his attorney's advice had been, he answered:
"A: Well, I don't know that he told me to get a lien waiver. He told me that I, that I, he must have tol<l me
that I should have some proof of pa~'ment or some release anyway.
Q: Did you request this of Mr. Pittman before vou paid
him?
"A: Yes, I did.
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Did he give you anything at all?
He gave me a lien waiver on the labor.
He did not give you any other type of lien waiver?
I asked for another type of lien waiver and he informed
me that he couldn't give it to me until he had paid the
bill.
"Q: So in line with i\fr. Pittman's testimonv, vou were
another one that he told that, Mr. vVillar.dse~ testified
also that, you were another one that he told that the
materials were not paid for at the time that you gave
him the money for your contract. Is th::t right?
"A: \Vell, that was the assumption.
"Q: That is correct, though, isn't it?
"A: \\'ell, I don't know. I don't think he s;1id that in those
kind of word<>. No.
"Q: \Vell, now. ue you-he told you that he could not give
you the lien waivers until he paid for the material. Is
that right? Is that what you testified previonsly?
"A: Well, I guess that is right.
"Q: So is it a logical assumption that the materials were
not paid for then at the time mu paid ~·("mr final payment?
"A: \Vell, I guess so. I guess it is." (T-241)
He further testified that at the time he paid the bill he
knew the materials had come from the plaintiff. (T-243)
Defendants' last witness, Lee Hermansen, testified that during
1960 and 1961 he operated a lumber compan~· at Ephraim, Utah;
that he did business with Comanche Construction Company,
selling them building materials and tools. Mr. Pittman was the
one who purchased from him for Com1riche Construction Company. (T-251)
Comanche Construction Compan~· became delinquent in
their bill and to trv to get straightened up, he testified that
he went up to Draper, Utah, and picked up some steel sheets
that were supposed to belong to Comanche Construction Company. (T-242 and T-253)
On cross-examination, Mr. Hermansen admitted that in
fact the steel belonged to Apex Lumber Company, and that on
"Q:
"A:
"Q:
"A:
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~he advice of his attorney he paid Apex Lumhcr Company for
it .. (T-256) As to.the typ~ of business his lumber company did

with Comanche Construction Company, he testified:
"Q: And what type of materials did vou se!P Tools, vou
mentioned.
·
"A: Well, I sold a lot of tools.
"Q: A lot of tools?
"A: Yes, and I made a lot of tin work for them.
"Q: Manufactured stuff?
"A: Yes, and they bought a lot of plastic cement to seal
their roofs. I did all their saw filing.'' (T-25.:J.)
On rebuttal, i\lr. J. \V. Child testified that on the dav Mr.
Blackham talked with ~.lr. Rasmussen, a check of Co~anche
Construction Company's ledger card (Exhibit 29) would have
shown:
"A: On January 23, 1960, Cmmnche Construction had a
credit balance with Apex Lumber and Hardware of
sixteen thousand four hundred eighty-two dollars
eighty-three cents. This means that they had paid in to
the lumber company sixteen thousand dollars more
than the jobs that had been completed and billed to
them as of January 23.
''THE COURT: '-''hat year w::is that'
"THE WITNESS: 1961." (T-261)
(Exhibit 54)
He also testified that H. J. Rasmussen was only a bookkeeper; that his title and total responsibility was doing book
work. As to his authority to sign lien waivers, !\Ir. Child said:
"A: No. As I testified before, he had no authority to sign
lien waivers and he had no authority to sign checks to
bind the corporation. He had no obligation from the
stockholders or no authoritv from the stockholders to
jeopardize the corporation ~r free the corporation from
obligations or liabilities. The only possibility would
have been, and I note that both of these are signed on
exactly the same day, and at the same time, so the
onlv
. answer is that it was done at nw. direction." (T266 and T-267)
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE PROVES THAT
PLAINTIFF NOT ONLY SUPPLIED THE MATERIAL
USED BY THE CONTRACTOR IN CONSTRUCTING
THE BUILDINGS ON DEFENDANTS' LAND, BUT RECEIVED ONLY PARTIAL PAYMENT FOR THE VALUE
OF SAID MATERIALS.
The undisputed testimony of Guy L. Pittman, the General Supervisor for Comanche Construction Company in Utah
at the time the pole-type turkey brooding buildin3s were constructed on dcf endants' land, is clear and unequivocal. Testifying at T-26, Mr. Pittman stated that the poles, steel, lumber
and hardware materials used in constructing the ,\toroni Feed
Compan~· building \Vere supplied by plaintiff. Likewise at T-33,
;\lr. Pittman testifie<l that the poles, steel, lumber and hardware
materials used in constructing the buildings on D. A. Shand's,
Howard 'Villardsen's and Richard Jensen's property came from
plaintiff.
The defendant not only failed to challenge ,\Ir. Pittman's
testimony on this point; they did not attempt to establish another source for the materials. Their witness, Mr. Hermansen,
the only materialman besides plaintiff \vho testified, admitted
that his business with Comanche Construction Company was
mostly in supplying tools and doing tin work. (T-254)
i\Ir. J. \V. Child, General Manager 0f plaintiff, testified
that the last payment received by plaintiff from Comanche
Construction Compan:-· was $8,ooo.oo on 'llarch 20, 1961. Defendants did not attempt to show that plaintiff received payment in cash from Comanche Constrnction Company at any
later date.
Defendants did not attempt to show that the materials
\hown on Exhibits 30 through 33 were not of the value claimed.
Rule 49(a) of the Ctah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
"SPECIAL VERDICTS AND INTERROGATORIES-(a)
Special Verdicts. The court ma~· require a jury to return
only a special verdict in the form of a special written find17

ing u_ron each ~ssue of. fact. In th2t event the court mav
submit . to the Jury wr_1ttcn interrogatories Sll5ceptible ~f
categoncal or other bnef answer or may submit written
forms of the several speci_al findings \vhich might properly
be made under the pleadings and evidence; or it may u;e
such o~her m_eth?d of submitting the issues and reg~iring
1
the wntten f mdmgs tnercon
as it deems most appropriate.
The court shall give to the jury such explanation and instruction concerning the matter thus submitted as may be
necessary to enable the jury to make its findings upon ·each
issue. If in so doing the court omits any issue of fact raised
by the pleadings or by the e\'idence, each party waives his
right to a trial by jury of the issue so omitted unless
before the jurv retires he demands its submission to the
jury. As to an issc1e omitted without such demand the
court may make a finding; or. if it fails to do so, it shall
be deemed to have made a finding in accord with the judgment on the special verdict."
The defendants requested the trial court to propound ~
l1uestion to the jury of whether or not more money was claimed by the plaintiff from the defendants than was actually due
the plaintiff for materials sold to Conunche Construction Company. (R-33) Since the defendants introduced no evidence of
any kind to create a basis for such a question the trial court
refused to direct the question to the jm~·· \Vhen the defendants
failed to raise an objection, it is clear that under Rule 49(a) the
defendants had abandoned any doubt the~- might have had that
the value of the materials claimed by plaintiff was unreasonc11 ;I~.

POINT II
THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE PROVES THAT UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF 14-2-1 AND 14-2-2 OF UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED, PLAINTIFF
HAS A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANTS
FOR THE UNPAID VALUE OF MATERIALS SUPPLIED
BY PLAINTIFF AND CSED IN THE CONSTRUCTIOJ\
OF BUILDINGS ON DEFENDANTS' LAND.

Sections 14-2-1 and 14-2-2 of the Utah Code Annotated,
53,
as amended, provides:
19
"14-2-1. The owner of any interest in land entering into a
contract, involving $soo or more, for the construction, addition to, or alteration or repair of, any building, structure
or improvement upon land shall, before any such work is
cor.m1enced, obtain from the contractor a ·bond in a sum
equal to the contract price, with good and sufficient sureties, conditioned for the faithful performance of the contract and prompt payment for material furnished and labor
performed under the contract. Such bond shall run to the
owner and to all other persons as their interest may appear;
and any person who has furnished materials or performed
labor for or upon any such building, structure or improvement, payment for which has not been made, shall have a
direct right of action against the sureties upon such bond
for the reasonable value of the materi'.1ls furnished or labor
performed, not exceeding, however, in an~· case the prices
agreed upon; which right of action shall accrue forty days
after the completion, or abandonment, or default in the
performance, of the work provided for in the contract.
"The bond herein provided sh~ll he exhibited to any
person interested, upon request.
"14-2-2. Any person subject to the provisions of this chapter, who shall fail to obtain such good and sufficient bond,
or to exhibit the same, as herein required, shall be personally
liable to all persons who have furnished materials or performed labor under the contract for the reasonable value
of such materials furnished or labor performed, not exceeding, however, in any case the prices agreed upon."
At the pretrial it was stipulated that buildings had been
built upon property owned by the defendants. It was further
stipulated that none of the defendants had requested nor required the Comanche Construction Company to provide a bond.
1R-28)
The statutes in question were first passed by the Utah Legislature in 191 5. Their constitutionality was upheld in 1917 in
Rio Grande I .umber Company vs. Darke, 'o Utah 114. 167 P.

241, L.R.A. l 9 1 8A, 1 19 3. They have been an integral part of
law in the State of Utah since said date.
The Lihc1 t:· Coal and Lumber Company \'S. Snow ( 1919 ).
53 l!tah 2 78, 178 P. H l, an action against property owner for
the value of materials used in the building constructed on owner's land, this court held the terms of the statute very broad and
sweeping, saying:
"If the owner of the bnd contracts for construction of
the building on his land, the statute makes it his duty to
comply with the terms if he desires to escape personai liability. The purpose of the statt•te is to prevent the owners
of land from having their lands improved with materi:ils
and labor furnished :md performed b:· third persons, and
thus to enhance the value of such lands without becoming
personally responsible for their reasonable value."
History has shown that often juries and courts find it extremely hard to require property owners to pay a second time
for the ,-alue of materials after once paying the contractor.
Plaintiff knew it would have to face this feeling when it realized it would have to present its claim before a jur:· composed
of friends and fellow-tradesmen of the defendants; and maybe
in no other case has the follo\\·ing admonition been more applicable, when in Kings Bros., Inc. vs. Utah Dry Kiln Company, Inc. (1962) 13 Utah 2d 339, 374 P. 2d 2q., this court in
remanding the case back to the trial court, commented on the
\'VTitten memorandum of the trial judge, stating:
"It made unmistakablv clear his disdain for the statute just
quoted and that he r;garded them as conferring an unjustified privilege upon one class and a penalty upon another.
It appears most likely that this idea was largely responsible
for his ruling dismissing the action; that question was given
quite thorough consideration by this court in the case of
Rio Grande Lumber Company vs. Darke; without belaboring the matter here we ref er to that decision and the reasoning given therein upon which the statute was held to
be valid. Nothing has been suggested to persuade us that
we should reconsider the latter."
Here the burden was completelv upon the defendants to

?O

see that Comanche Construction Company was bonded before
construction ever was commenced on their property. Since the
[and owner is the one 'vho controls the money, h~ is the only
one '' J:o can exercise the necessary control ov~r the contract~r
that would force him into obtai~ing the bond. If a materialman or laborer tried to insist upon such terms, the contractor
\\'Ould merely hire new employees or move to different suppliers.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN ACCEPTING THE JURY'S
ANS\VER TO QUESTIO~ THREE OF THE SPECIAL
VERDICT, \VHEREIN THE JURY FOUND THAT ACCEPTA:·,/CE BY PLAINTIFF OF CONTRACTOR'S UNSECL1RED PROMISSORY NOTES CONSTTTCTED PAY.\lENT IN FULL.
The general ntle of law is cle;irl!' statcJ, that the taking
of a Lill, note or check is not payment unless it is agreed to
be taken as such. In the absence of such :rn at:reement, it is only
conditional payment dependent upon the payment of the p~
per; and if the paper is dishonored, an action ma:- be maintained on the original i'ldebtedness. Ellison vs. Henion ( 192.0 ), 183
Cal. 17 1, 190 P. 798, I 1 A. L. R. 444.
In First National Bank of Portland vs. Nobie et al. ( 1946)
179 Or. 26. 168 P. 2d 354, 169 A. L. R. 1426, the court said,
"\Vhen a debtor gives his own check or promissory note
to a creditor, prima facie the transaction is conditional payment only. But even in such a case the ultimate question
is one of intention of the parties to the transaction."
In Farmers and i\1erchants Bank \'S. Universal C. I. T.
11955) 4 Utah 2d 155, 289 P. 2d I04'· this court stated:
"A great deal of argument is devoted to the question of
whether or not the bank intended to accept the $z 1,ooo
note as payment from Parsley, thus discharging appellant
from the obligation. However, the trial court found that
there was no agreement to that effect and the finding is
supported by c~mpetent evidence. In the absence of such
an agreement, the rule as set out in 40 Am. Jur, Payment,
sec. 87, is:
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" 'The general rule is that a note giv:::n by a debtor for
a precedent debt "ill not oe held to extinguish the
debt, in effect, hut "-ill he c1 imi dcrcd as conditional
payment or as collateral sccurit\·, or as an acknnwledgernent or memorandum of the amount :1scer::ained
to lie due. The d0ctrine proceeds on the obviou 1
ground that nothing can he justl:·; comidered as pavment in fact but that which is in truth such, unl~ss
something else is exprC'ssl:· agreed to be received in its
place. That a mere pro!11ise to pa\· C•1!1not of itself bt
re?ardcJ as an effecti,·e pa:·111ent is m.mife~t.' ,.
The defendants clc,11h· foil in their burd:::~ of sho">in~
an agreement between pl;iintiff and Com:mche Constructin~
Company that acceptance by plaintiff of the two un1ecurc:d
promissor:· notes would be payment in full. :\Ir. J. \V. Child
testified it was never a;!"reed that the note<; \vnulJ he satisfac
tion fur the full accounts recei\·at;le. At T-!:1 ..\Ir. ChilJ said.
" . . . And I had him gfre me these rn o promissory note>
which would, I felt, obligate him to ;~ivc me this additional
money \\·hen he got it collected." At T-11-t, a~~ain .\Ir. Child
stated, " . _ . I certain!:· did not take them in pa:·ment of the
account."
It is significant to note, that the trial court, after hearing
all the evidence. ruled as :i matter of b w that the notes were
not taken in satisfaction of Comanche Construction Company·,
account, and refused to propound the defendants' requested
guestions which set out the notes as a defense. (R-36)
The defendants also clear!~- failed to show an:· dispute between plaintiff and Comanche Construction Compan~· as to the
balance of the accounts receivable.
The Re-statement of Contracts. Sec. 419, says:
"\Vhen a contract is made for the ~atisfaction of a pre-existing contractural duty or duty to make compensation. the
interpretation is assumed in case of doubt, if the pre-existing- duty is an undisputed duty, either to make compensati~n or. to pay a liquified sum of money, that only performance of the subsel1uent contract will discharge the
pre-existing debt; but if the pre-existing dutv is of another

kind that the subsequent contract shall immediately discharge the pre-existing duty and be substituted for it."
If a dispute had existed between plaintiff and Comanche
Construction Company over the amount of the account, it might
be argued that the law of "Accord and Satisfaction" would apply. But, here again, the defendants would fail. No matter what
agreement was reached for an "accord", the defendants failed
r~ sho\\' any performance by Comanche Construction that would
constitute a "satisfaction". 1 Am. Jur. zd 344, Sec. 47, summarizes the law exactly when it states:
"The accord is the agreement, the satisfaction is the execution or performance of such agreement. 1.Vhen an accord is followed by a sati5faction, it is a bar to the asscrti(Jil of the original claim, but until so folJm·.-ed. it has no
effect."
See Browning \·s. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 94
L'tah 5 32, 7 2 P. zd w6o, Rehearing denied 9·t Ctah 570, 80 P.
zd HS. Also see 66 A. L. R. 352, for n:any citations in support of the general rule under mechanics' lien bw that the
acceptance of the written obligations d the contractor or a
third person, from the contractor, by one who has furnished
him with labor or materials, is not of itself sufficient to preclude him from claiming a lien on the improved or newly conmucted property.
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED I~ ACCEPTING THE JURY'S
,\~S\VER TO QCESTIO~ THREE OF THE SPECIAL
\'ERDICT, \VHEREI~ THE COCRT FOUND THAT
PLAINTIFF'S RECOVERY FR0.\1 THF DEFENDANTS
\VAS BARRED BY £STOPPEL.
Each defendant testified personal!\· that it was the assurance given by plaintiffs employee, H. J. Rasmussen, to Mr.
Uifford Blackham, during a telephone com·ersation on January
z 3. 1961, that Comanche Construction Company's accounts were
clear and that it was clear to go ahead and make final payment,
that caused them to make the final payment to Comanche Construction for their buildings.
Plaintiff submits that neither in fact, nor in law, can the

defendants claim the defense of estoppel against plaintiff.
·
I C . I. T.,
. Ind SFarmers and Merchants Bank· vs. U 01versa
(c
. 1te
upra) this court said:
"As stated in ]. T. F arg:i.son Cu. vs. Furst, 8 Cir, 2 ~ F.
7
306, 310:
" 'Equitable estoppel is bottomed upon the notion that
when one person makes representations to anothei
which warrant the latter in actin~; in a given war.
the one making such representations "ill not be pe·rmi~ted to change his position when such change "·ould
bring about inequitable conset1uences to the other person, \\·ho relied Pn the rcprcs:>ntJtions and acted thereon in good faith. i< "' "' "' T!.ic rc:prcscllt,1tiom made

must be in themseh:es sufficient to ,...._.,nrant the action
taken, and their sufficiency is a judicial question. ft
is not enough that the person who heard them deemed
that he "..ms "<.4.'arrmztcd in actillr.; as he cfid; t!.ie lanp:uage
used ought of itself to fumisb the "..:.:arrant. One man
might comider himself 'l.l,\1/T,1med in acting upon representations 7.l:holly i11mfficie7lt to move a more careful
and prudent person.' " (emphasis ad<led)

Mr. Clifford Blackham has been l\1anager of the Hatchery and Brooder Divisions of .\Ioroni Feed Cornpan~' for fifteen years, a trained businessman. Comanche Construction Comp:rny had built a pole-type building for him personal!~' and haJ
given him written lien waivers on the materials \vhen \Ir.
Blackham made his final payment.
After talking to the other defendants, l\lr. Blackham was
aware of the delinquent labor pa)'ments, overdrafts at the bank,
unpaid oil and lumber bills of Comanche Construction Company. He made the telephone call because he was concerned
with the financial status of Comanche Construction Company.
l\fr. Blackham was, in fact, in a much better position than
plaintiff to know about Comanche Construction Company's financial status. Under cross-examination, Mr. Blackham admitted
that in substance his question to Mr. Rasmussen \\·as not whether all the materials were paid for but whether Comanche Construction Company was in default with plaintiff. (T-zo7)

The Moroni Feed Company building was not finished until
,Vlarch 1, 1961. It is hard to believe that a businessman would
not expect circumstances to have changed materially between
January 2 Jfd and when final payment for the Moroni Feed
Company building was made following its completion. Mr.
Blackham did not make more inquiries.
Defendants, D. A. Shand and Howard Willardsen, should
look to :\tr. Blackham for help since he is the one that mislead
chem. if anyone did. They, in fact, knrn: from Mr. Guy L. Pittman that the materials in. their buildings were not paid for. Mr.
Shand even made the final payment against the advice of his
attorney.
Defendant, Richard Jensen, must be charged with the same
knowledbe, not only from what i\lr. Pittman told him but he
stated he acted on what he was told bv Mr. Shand.
The fact is, that all the def end ants .from one source or another knew that plaintiff had not recci,·ed pa! ment for the materials in their buildings. It cannot follow that legally they can
place the burden of their actions on the plaintiff. \Ir. Rasmussen did nothing more than report to :\Ir. Blackham the present
status of Comanche Construction Company as reflected by
plaintiff's ledger card. which showe<l a credit balance on January 23, 1961.
19 Am. Jur, Sec. 42, at page 640, says:
"General principles: The doctrine of estoppel in pais is
founded upon the principles of morality and fair dealing
and is intended to subserve the ends of justice. It always
presupposes error on one side and fault or fraud upon the
other and some defect of which it would be inequitable for
the party against whom the doctrine is asserted to take advantage. The essential elements of an equitable estoppel
as related to the party estopped are:
" ( 1) Conduct which amounts to a false representation
or concealment of the material facts, or, at least which is
calculated to convey the impression that facts are otherwise than and incon~istent with those which the party subsequentl!· attempts to assert;
" ( 2) Intention or at least expectation that such conduct

will be acted upon by the other party;
" ( 3) Knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real
facts.
"As related to the party claiming the estoppel, thev are:
"( 1) Lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge of the truth as to the facts in question;
" ( 2) Reliance upon the conduct of the party e'topped;
and
" ( 3) Action based thereon of such a character as to
change his position prejudiciallv.''
The plaintiff never falsely represented. The defendants
never suffered from lack of knowledge or the means of g-aining
knowledge. In fact, they merely had to follow the ad~·ice of
their attorney after asking for it. All of the defendants had
knowledge that at the time final payment was made the full
value of the materials had not heen p:iid.
POINT V
THE JURY'S ANS\VERS TO THE INTERROGATORIES OF THE SPECIAL VERDICT ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE, AND THE COURT ERRED IN
FAILING TO DIRECT A VERDICT FOR THE PLAINTIFF NOTWITHST ANDIKG THE SPECIAL VERDICT.
Under Rule 49(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
the trial court presented a special verdict ·with six written interrogatories to the jury. Questions one, two, three and four
were concerned with whether or not materials supplied by
plaintiff had been used in constructing defendants' buildings and
what the unpaid value of said materials might be. Questions five
and six were directed to the telephone call.
The jury, however, ignored their instructions and deciding
law instead of facts, found for the defendants, in essence on
the grounds of estoppel and by applying a rule of law rhau
the trial court had refused to propound to them; i.e., acceptance of the notes by plaintiff constituted payment.
On question one, the jury found that materials purchased
by Comanche Construction Company from plaintiff \Vere used
in constructing the defendants' buildings.

On question two, the jury was asked to determine the unpaid ,·alue of said material. The jury answered, "none." The evidence will not support the determination. The trial court had
ruled as a matter of law on the question of the notes, and a telephone call does not pay a debt. The telephone call may create
a situation that would bar collection under estoppel, but as this
court said in Farmers and Merchants Bank vs. Universal C. I. T.
(Cited Supra), estoppel is a judicial question and not within
the jury's jurisdiction.
Plaintiff introduced undisputed evidence that the materials
,, ere of the ,·alue claimed. There is no other evidence to explain the jury's answer, except the notes.
Questions three and four were propounded by the trial
court so that the jury could determine the facts necessary for
granting a money judgment if the court should so decide. The
jurv's answers to both questions were unresponsive.
· · Questions five and six ,,·ent to validity of the telephone
call between Clifford Blackham and plaintiff's employee, H. J.
Rasmussen. Plaintiff submits that the evidence does not substantiate the jury's answers.
Therefore, based on the jurv's failure to follow the court's
directions and their answers which are not supported by the
evidence, the trial court erred in denying plaintiff's motion for
verdict notwithstanding the special verdict.
Respectfully submitted,
L. H. GRIFFITHS
4962 South State Street

Murray City, Utah
Attornev for Plaintiff-Appellant

